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Abstract
The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very
consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to the semantic paradoxes such as the
Liar or the set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell’s paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent
logics, dialetheism— the view that some contradictions are true — became a major player in
the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed
with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled
against the divine attributes.
Traditional monotheists usually agree: God is essentially omnipotent and omniscient.¹ Yet
many of the logical objections to monotheism concern these divine attributes. The objections
purport to show that, on pain of inconsistency, there is no God in the traditional theist’s sense.
Some philosophers, notably Descartes [], Frankfurt [], and Conee [], have defended
theism by accepting some forms of inconsistency. They endorse the claim that God is able to know
true contradictions or is able to bring about inconsistent states of aﬀairs. Unfortunately, the view
has never been worked out in any logical detail. In the last half-century, the development of para-
consistent logics has given philosophers ways to reason about inconsistent theories. Dialetheism,
the view that some contradictions can be true, has recently been defended as a way to handle all
the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. But the paradoxes of omnipotence and omniscience
are parallel to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. So dialetheism and paraconsistent logic
should prove helpful in developing an inconsistent theory of classical monotheism.
⁰This is a preprint of an article whose ﬁnal and deﬁnitive form will be published in the Australasian Journal of
Philosophy available online at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/.
¹See [] for medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian perspectives.
The purpose of this article is largely exploratory: I examine how dialetheic theories might
respond to the paradoxes of the divine attributes, making full use of paraconsistent logic. I argue
that if we grant the theist all the resources of dialetheism and paraconsistency the paradoxes are
not logically problematic. The formal implementation of these logics, however, lead to some
additional consequences which theists may ﬁnd troubling. The dialetheic theist can accept that
God is omnipotent and omniscient, but only at the cost of also accepting that God is also not
omnipotent and not omniscient; omniscience and omnipotence are inconsistent properties. I also
discuss whether the view is committed to the more troubling claim that God both does and does
not exist. I motivate and develop a number of ways dialetheic theists might attempt to avoid these
consequences by limiting the spread of inconsistency. Finally, I close by considering whether any
speciﬁc form of dialetheism is better-motivated within some theological traditions.
 Preliminaries
. Motivations
Ompotence and omniscience appear to implicitly quantify over absolutely everything. When we
assert God’s omnipotence, we typically claim that there is nothing, no event or state of aﬀairs,
that God cannot bring about. Similarly, when we assert God’s omniscience we typically claim
that there is nothing, no true proposition, that God does not or cannot know. But the paradoxes
of omnipotence and omniscience purport to show that an absolutely unrestricted reading of these
claims leads directly to contradiction. The standard reply to these paradoxes is to claim that the
paradoxical events or propositions — by virtue of being contradictory — are impossible, and
hence not a member of the domain of quantiﬁcation. But in some cases the events or proposi-
tions in question are not obviously logically impossible simpliciter, but merely incompatible with
the existence of an omniscient or omnipotent being. There is a prima facie worry that the stan-
dard reply attempts to explain away counterexamples by restricting the domain of quantiﬁcation.
These issues are dialectically delicate, but one thing is for certain: much ink has been devoted to
defending consistent solutions to the omni-paradoxes. Almost none has been devoted to a di-
aletheist solution to the logical problems for theism, despite the fact that it is a strong contender
in directly parallel debates in philosophical logic.
Theists have theological reasons for taking the dialetheic view seriously, too, by virtue of
their commitment to God’s aseity. God has ontologically priority over everything else; chains of
ontological dependence must always ‘ground out’ in God. Descartes tied ontological priority to
omnipotence:
The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and
depend upon him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed to say that
theses truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn
and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates. Please do not hesitate to assert and
proclaim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just as a
king lays down laws in his kingdom. […]
It will be said that if God has established these truths he could change them as
a king changes his laws. To this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can change.
[…] In general we can assert that God can do everything that is within our grasp but
not that he cannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would be rash to think that our
imagination reaches as far as his power. (‘To Mersenne’, [, p. ])
More speciﬁcally, regarding contradictions he writes:
I turn to the diﬃculty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely and
indiﬀerently if he had made it false that the three angles of a triangle should equal
two right angles, or generally that contradictories could not be true together. It is
easy to dispel this diﬃculty by considering that the power of God cannot have any
limits […] God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories
cannot be true together, and therefore that he could have done the opposite. (‘To
Mesland’, [, p. ]
If God is prior to logical principles, or that God ‘cannot have been determined’ to act consistently
by the law of non-contradiction, then there is motivation for a dialetheic approach.
A brief aside: there may be good reason to drive a wedge between ‘God can do x’ and ‘it’s
logically possible that God does x’. A statement of the former need not commit one to the latter
if there is some broader notion of possibility than logical possibility in play. So, one might think
that contradictions are logically impossible, and yet, theologically possible. Indeed, Conee []
seems to come close to this sort of view. Such a view would appear to require a background
paraconsistent logic, as we would need to have models with inconsistent worlds or states of aﬀairs.
It may be tempting to think that this view might be non-dialetheic, however, as we will see below,
contradictions have a tendency to ‘spread’ from impossible worlds to possible ones, and from
possible worlds to the actual world. In what follows, then, I will make a simplifying assumption
and identify logical possibility with theological possibility, assuming the statement ‘God can do
x’ is equivalent to ‘it’s logically possible that God does x’.²
. Dialetheism and Paraconsistent Logic
Dialetheism is the view that contradictions — sentences of the form A ∧ ¬A — can be true.
Following Restall [], we distinguish two kinds of dialetheism: full-strength dialetheism is the
view that there (actually) are true contradictions, and light dialetheism is the view that it is possible
for contradictions to be true, but there aren’t any (actually).
In classical logic, the following rule of inference is valid.
() A ∧ ¬A ⊧ B
This inference is called ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ); it claims that any sentence
B follows from a contradiction. A dialetheist must reject ECQ on pain of a commitment to
²That is not to say that there isn’t interesting work to be done in this area, but I will not attempt to do it here. I
hope to address some of these questions in future work.
trivialism i.e. a commitment to the truth of every sentence. Logics for which ECQ fails are called
paraconsistent logics; they allow for consideration of contradictory but non-trivial theories. It will
be useful, then, to consider what consequences are in the oﬃng for dialetheic theism by appealing
to a paraconsistent logic.
The basic paraconsistent logic most useful for our purposes is Priest’s [] quantiﬁed Logic
of Paradox, or LP, extended to include modal operators. Of all the paraconsistent logics, the
semantics for LP are the simplest, and a minimal revision to classical logic — indeed, it has
classical logic as a proper extension. Notably, all the classical logical truths are logical truths of
LP.
The syntax of LP is usual; we also include the symbols for alethic modality: ◻ and ◇. LP is
a three-valued logic. In classical logic, the set of values V = {1;0} has 1 as the only designated
value. In LP, V = {1; 12 ;0} and is ordered thus: 1 > 12 > 0. One can think of the value 12 as ‘both
true and false’. Importantly, in LP both 1 and 12 are designated values.
The models of LP are structures: ⟨W;D; ⟩. Here W is a non-empty set of ‘worlds’.³ D is our
non-empty domain of objects. Here,  is an interpretation function that satisﬁes (a)–(l) below.⁴
a. For every name c, (c) ∈ D.⁵
b. For every n-ary predicate P and w ∈W, +w(P) ⊆ Dn and −w(P) ⊆ Dn and +w(P) ∪ −w(P) =
Dn.⁶
c. For every n-ary predicate P and terms a1; : : : ; an, w(P(a1; : : : ; an)) = 1 iﬀ ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∈
³Standard frames for normal modal logics have an accessibility relation on worlds R ⊆W×W. For modal operators
I am presupposing ‘universal access’ and so drop R for simplicity.
⁴The approach here is a combination of the many-valued ﬁrst-order logics given in Priest [, ch. ] and the modal
semantics given in Priest [, p. ].
⁵Let us stipulate, for simplicity, that every object in the domain has a name. We have taken a ﬁxed-domain approach
to the semantics, so that all of our names are rigid ; for any w and w′ in W, w(c) = w′(c).
⁶Dn is the nth Cartesian product of the domain, so D×D× : : :×D n-many times. Thus,  gives the extensions and
anti-extensions of our predicates. The extension, +, is the set of objects in the domain of which the predicate is true. The
anti-extension, −, is the set of objects in the domain of which the predicate is false. The extensions and anti-extensions
are relative to a world; that is, w(P) need not be the same as w′(P). Like classical logic, the union of +w(P) with
−w(P) is the entirety of the domain, thus we have no truth-value ‘gaps’. This latter assumption is not required, and
may even be disadvantageous. See Beall and Cotnoir [].
+w(P) and ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∉ −w(P)
d. w(P(a1; : : : ; an)) = 12 iﬀ ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∈ +w(P) and ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∈ −w(P) ⁷
e. w(P(a1; : : : ; an)) = 0 iﬀ ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∉ +w(P) and ⟨(a1); : : : ; (an)⟩ ∈ −w(P)
f. For every variable v and formula A with only v free, w(∀vA) = min{w(Av(c)): for all
names c}⁸
g. w(∃vA) = max{w(Av(c)): for all names c}
h. For all sentences A and B, w(A ∧ B) = min{w(A); w(B)}
i. w(A ∨ B) = max{w(A); w(B)}
j. For every sentence A, w(¬A) = 1 − w(A)
k. w(◻A) = min{w′(A): for all w′}
l. w(◇A) = max{w′(A): for all w′}
Let ⊃ and ≡ be deﬁned as ¬A ∨ B and (¬A ∨ B) ∧ (¬B ∨ A) respectively. A sentence is satisﬁed
(in-a-model, at-a-world) iﬀ the value of that sentence (in-the-model, at-that-world) is designated.
An argument from a set of premises X to a conclusion A is valid (X ⊧ A) iﬀ every model which
satisﬁes X at some world, satisﬁes A at that world.
I note two useful facts. As in classical normal modal logics, the modal operators are interde-
ﬁnable:
() ¬◇¬A ⊧LP ◻A
⁷Here we allow for the possibility that +w(P) and −w(P) ≠ ∅ have a non-empty intersection, resulting in truth-value
‘gluts’.
⁸Av(c) abbreviates the result of substituting some name c for all free occurrences of v in A. This takes the place
of variable assignments, since we have stipulated that all objects in the domain have a name. These semantics for
quantiﬁers in many-valued logic are fairly typical; see Priest [].
Likewise, as in classical ﬁrst-order logic, the quantiﬁers are interdeﬁnable:
() ∀vA ⊧LP ¬∃v¬A
It is well-known that disjunctive syllogism fails in paraconsistent logics. Since the material
conditional, ⊃, is simply a disguised disjunction, it follows that material modus ponens fails:
() A;A ⊃ B ⊭LP B
Letting w(A) = 12 and w(B) = 0 yields a counterexample. There is much debate over which
conditional is the ‘correct’ one for paraconsistent logics. Adding a detachable conditional often
brings with it the troublesome issues surrounding Curry’s paradox. While the choice of a suitable
conditional is largely beside the main point of this paper (most of argued-for results turn on the
semantics for the quantiﬁers or modal operators), some issues arise in § which directly relate
to this choice. One of the most plausible paraconsistent conditionals is found in the logic DKQ
([, p. ], [], []). (A brief presentation of DKQ can be found in the Appendix.) The
conditional, which we will write ‘→’, satisﬁes modus ponens, identity, contraposition, and many
other intuitive conditional rules; it does this all while avoiding Curry’s paradox and the related
logical principles that allow for its derivation.⁹ We can deﬁne a DKQ biconditional as follows:
A↔ B iﬀ (A→ B)∧(B→ A). For our purposes, we will useDKQwhere issues require a detachable
conditional. Where they do not, we will simply rely on LP reasoning. Armed with paraconsistent
logic in the background, we can now return to our main task: evaluating the omni-paradoxes.
⁹The DKQ conditional does not have a truth table, but is sound with respect to the truth table of the conditional
in RM3, given below. → 1 12 0
1 1 0 0
1
2 1
1
2 0
0 1 1 1
Since anything invalid by the RM3 truth tables is also DK invalid, this can be a useful way of checking for inferences
that break down.
 The Paradox of the Stone
The paradox of the stone begins with a question: can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift?
The following argument is meant to show that, whatever the answer, God is not omnipotent.¹⁰
i. Either God can create a stone which he cannot lift or he cannot.
ii. If God can create a stone which he cannot lift, then God cannot do everything.
iii. If God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift, then God cannot do everything.
iv. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
The argument is meant to undermine an unrestricted notion of omnipotence. Where B is a binary
predicate standing for the relation of x bringing about some event y:
() x is omnipotent ↔ ∀y(◇B(x; y))
An omnipotent being is such that for events y, it is possible for that being to bring about y.
. Consistent Responses
The standard line of response, originating from Aquinas and defended by contemporary theists,
is to deny (iii). The contention is that God need not be required to do the logically impossible in
order to be omnipotent. All that is required for omnipotence is the ability to do what is possible
to be done.
() x is omnipotent ↔ ∀y(◇∃zB(z; y)→◇B(x; y))
Here we require an omnipotent being to be able to bring about any event that is logically possible
to bring about.
¹⁰There are many diﬀerent versions of the paradox, but perhaps the best version is due to Homer Simpson, who
asked: “Can Jesus microwave a burrito so hot that he himself cannot eat it?”, which as far as melon-scratchers go is a
honey doodle [].
One trouble with this line of response: there is nothing logically impossible about the de-
scription ‘x is able to make a thing too heavy for x to lift’.¹¹ It is perfectly consistent for some
less-than-omnipotent being to create a stone too heavy for it to lift. So, this restricted version of
omnipotence apparently does not solve the problem.
But certainly, one must admit that there is something inconsistent about an omnipotent being
creating such a stone. So, one might try to restrict the domain of quantiﬁcation so that om-
nipotence requires the ability to do only those actions appropriate for whatever kind of being it
is.
() x is omnipotent ↔ ∀y∀z(('(z)→◇B(z; y))→ ('(x)→◇B(x; y)))
The contention here is that an omnipotent being must be able to bring about all events possible
for anything of kind '.
Many have pointed out, however, that this response makes the property of ‘being omnipo-
tent’ all too easily gained. Consider the omnipotence of McEar, who only has the capability of
scratching his ear.¹² This notion of omnipotence seems to radically diverge from the conception
of omnipotence as absolutely unrestricted.
. Inconsistent Responses
Some theists have denied premise (ii).¹³ From the possibility of God making an unliftable rock,
it does not follow that God actually fails to be omnipotent unless God actually does create such
a rock. Hence, God’s actual capacity to do so is compatible with his omnipotence so long as he
does not act on it. Of course, in any possible world where God makes an unliftable rock it follows
that he is not omnipotent in that possible world. Given that God is necessarily omnipotent, this
view commits one to the possibility of God’s being both omnipotent and not. This view, then, is
¹¹Mavrodes [].
¹²See Plantinga [, p. ] and LaCroix [, p. ]. The main point behind these examples dates back to Ockham.
¹³Notably, Swinburne [] has argued for this view, while rejecting that God is essentially or necessarily omnipotent.

a form of light dialetheism.
But light dialetheism is a slippery slope that can lead to full-strength dialetheism. In this case
one might grant the rejection of (ii) but replace it with (ii*): necessarily, if God makes a stone he
cannot lift, then it is not the case that he can bring about every event. But (ii*) leads to problems,
as the following argument shows. Let g be ‘God’, and s be the relevant unliftable-stone-making
event.
i. ◻∀y◇ B(g; y) [Omnipotence of g]
ii*. ◻(B(g; s)→ ¬∀y(◇B(g; y))) [Premise]
iii. ◇B(g; s) [Premise]
iv. ◇¬∀y(◇B(g; y)) [MP (ii*), (iii)]
v. ¬◇¬∀y(◇B(g; y)) [equivalent to (i)]
vi. ◇¬∀y(◇B(g; y)) ∧ ¬◇ ¬∀y(◇B(g; y)) [Conjunction of (iv), (v)]
Notice that (vi) is a sentence of the form A ∧ ¬A — an actual contradiction. And so even using
rules acceptable in a paraconsistent setting, allowing for the possibility of God bringing about a
state-of-aﬀairs contradictory to his omnipotence entails full-strength dialetheism.
It may be argued that (ii*) is intuitively too strong. Frankfurt [] has pointed out that if we
are allowing God to perform a contradictory action — that of creating the unliftable stone —
why should he not be able to perform an additional contradictory action — that of lifting the
unliftable stone? If this is allowed, then God can lift the unliftable stone. If it is possible for God
to lift the unliftable stone even in a possible situation where he cannot, then in that situation
there is nothing he cannot do. Hence, (ii*) as it stands appears false. This line of argument would
appear to avoid the conclusion that if it is possible for God to make an unliftable rock then it is
impossible.

Or so it would seem. Given standard paraconsistent tools, the conclusion is not avoided. If a
stone is to be truly unliftable, it must be false in every world that God brings about the lifting of
it (l): w(¬B(g; l)) is designated for all worlds w. And if God truly lifts the unliftable stone, then
it must be true in some world that God brings about the lifting of it: w′(B(g; l)) is designated for
some world w′. So, w(◇(¬B(g; l)∧B(g; l))) is also designated — a possibly true contradiction.
But in modal paraconsistent logics like LP, the truth of possible contradictions implies the truth
of actual ones.¹⁴ In general:
() ◇ (A ∧ ¬A) ⊧LP ◇(A ∧ ¬A) ∧ ¬◇ (A ∧ ¬A)
¹⁵
Applied above, the result shows that the dialetheic theist is committed to it being possible and
impossible that God lift the unliftable stone. The contradiction ‘spreads’ from a merely possible
world to a contradiction in the actual world. It looks as though light dialetheists are committed
to full-blown dialetheism.
But full-strength dialetheism has its upside. After all, in our paraconsistent setting◇(¬B(g; l)
does not rule out ∀y◇B(g; y), even when the universal quantiﬁer ranges over events like the lifting
of and unliftable rock. It still has a designated value, which means we can accept that for all y it
is possible for God to bring about y; we can endorse the omnipotence of God.
But this upside has a downside: God’s omnipotence requires omnipotence to be an incon-
sistent property. In other words, given the actual contradiction, we have w(¬ ◇ B(g; l)) = 12 .
But then we have w(∃y¬◇ B(g; y)) = 12 . (This last step relies relies on our treatment of quanti-
ﬁers ranging over a constant domain at all possible worlds. On a variable domain treatment, we
would still be stuck with the fact that it is possible that there is an event that is impossible for
¹⁴This point is due to Restall [].
¹⁵Assume w(◇(A ∧ ¬A)) is designated; so max{w′(A ∧ ¬A)} ∈ {1; 12} which can only happen if max{w′(A ∧¬A)} = 12 . So w(◇(A ∧ ¬A)) = 12 . But then w(¬◇ (A ∧ ¬A)) = 12 . Hence, w(◇(A ∧ ¬A) ∧ ¬◇ (A ∧ ¬A)) = 12 ,
which is designated.

God, together the actual impossibility that God both lift and not lift the stone.) So the dialetheic
theist must endorse the claim that there is some event that God cannot actually bring about, or
equivalently ¬∀y◇ B(g; y) the claim that it’s not the case that God can bring about everything.
And this by deﬁnition would mean that God both is and also is not omnipotent. That is, God’s
omnipotence is had inconsistently; his character is self-contradictory.
 Milne’s Paradox
Dialetheic theism can also handle some more recent paradoxes of omniscience. One such paradox
advanced by Peter Milne [] concerns the sentence S below.
(S) No omniscient being knows that which the sentence S expresses.
Let O be an omniscience predicate and K a binary predicate where K(x; y) means x knows y. We
use ⌜S⌝ as a name for the sentence S. Then (S) is equivalent to ¬∃x(Ox ∧ K(x; ⌜S⌝)).
Milne argues that S is a paradox for omniscience. His argument is that if we assume that there
is some omniscient being g who knows that S, we get a contradiction.
i. Og ∧ K(g; ⌜S⌝) [Assumption]
ii. K(g; ⌜S⌝) [(i), Simpliﬁcation]
iii. S [(ii), Factivity of Knowledge]
iv. ¬∃x(Ox ∧ K(x; ⌜S⌝)) [(iii), Substitution]
v. ¬(Og ∧ K(g; ⌜S⌝)) [(iv), Instantiation]
The supposition that there is an omniscient being implies its negation.
Given the similarities between S and Liar-like paradoxes (especially the Knower paradox), one
might attempt a consistent response by requiring only that God know consistent propositions.
But unlike Liar sentences, S does have a consistent interpretation. If there are no omniscient

beings, S is straightforwardly true. So, even though it is self-referential, there is nothing self-
undermining about S. Milne concludes then that either omniscient beings do not exist, or if they
do we must be dialetheists.¹⁶
One might object that the dialetheic perspective should be rejected since it appears to require
failures of the factivity of knowledge. If one allows that God can know contradictions, we allow
that God can know some false propositions. This is correct so far as it goes; but for the dialetheist,
contradictions while being false may also be true. Only contradictions which are true (and false)
can be known. Hence, the factivity of knowledge is preserved.¹⁷
We saw that a dialetheic approach to the paradox of the stone led to the conclusion that God’s
omnipotence was an inconsistent attribute. Does the same hold true for omniscience? Here is a
reason to think that it does.
Given a truth predicate T that holds only for true (and inconsistently true) sentences, here is
a deﬁnition of omniscience.
() x is omniscient ↔ ∀y(T(y)↔ K(x; y))
Given that ⌜S⌝ can be plugged in for y, w(T(⌜S⌝)) = 12 and w(K(g; ⌜S⌝)) = 12 , then w(T(⌜S⌝)↔
K(x; ⌜S⌝)) will be both true and false.¹⁸ Supposing God knows every other truth, we will have
it that the minimum value of {w(T(c) → K(x; c) ∶ for all names c} can never be higher than 12 ,
and hence that God is both omniscient and not.
What this shows is that God, by virtue of knowing a contradiction, has his omniscience is
inconsistently. Omniscience, like omnipotence, is inconsistently attributed to God. There are two
lines of reply: one might bite the bullet and accept this as another aspect of dialetheic theism, or
one might employ other formal tools to avoid the consequence (options are explored in §).
¹⁶In fact, Milne’s stated conclusion is not merely that any theist must be a dialetheist, but also that God himself must
be a dialetheist. After all, any omniscient being, therefore, must know that S is contradictory, and know that he knows
it.
¹⁷See Priest [, §.].
¹⁸This holds in DKQ, by axioms I and VI (see Appendix).

 Grim’s Paradox
Grim [, ] has leveled an objection to the existence of omniscient beings by arguing that there
is no set of all truths. The objection has parallels to the set-theoretic paradoxes (e.g. Russell’s
paradox¹⁹), which are among the main motivations for dialetheism.²⁰
Suppose for reductio there is a set A of all truths. For every subset si of A and a ∈ A, there
exists a truth expressed by one of the following two sentences: a ∈ si or a ∉ si. So, one of these
two sentences will be in A, for every si. Thus, there are at least as many members of A as there are
members of the powerset of A. But this contradicts Cantor’s Theorem, which states that for any
set X, the cardinality of X is strictly less than the cardinality of its powerset. Therefore, there is no
set of all truths.
Grim thinks this argument has application to omniscience.
Were there an omniscient being, what that being would know would constitute a set
of all truths. But there can be no set of all truths, and so can be no omniscient being.
([, p. ])
The argument goes something like this:
i. ∃x∀y(T(y)↔ K(x; y))→ ∃z(z = {S ∶ T(⌜S⌝)}) [Premise]
ii. ¬∃z(z = {S ∶ T(⌜S⌝)}) [Grim’s proof ]
iii. Therefore, ¬∃x∀y(T(y)↔ K(x; y)) [MT, (i)–(ii)]
And given our above deﬁnition of omniscience, this just is the claim that there are no omniscient
beings.
¹⁹More precisely, it is directly analogous to Russell’s paradox of propositions
²⁰See Priest [, chs. , ].
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. Consistent Responses
One line of response to this argument is to reject premise (i).²¹ As Plantinga [] has rightly
noted, the ﬁrst premise relies on the assumption that quantiﬁcation essentially involves sets (or
set-like entities). Even if we grant that there is no set of all truths, why should it follow that there
is no being that knows all truths?
Bringsjord [] oﬀers two lines of response to Grim’s paradox of omniscience. The ﬁrst con-
sciously parallels the more restrictive consistent responses to omnipotence. He rejects the unre-
stricted deﬁnition
() x is omniscient ↔ ∀y(T(y)↔ K(x; y))
and proposes a restricted deﬁnition of omniscience:²²
() x is omniscient ↔ ∀y((T(y) ∧◇K(x; y))↔ K(x; y))
Here x is omniscient just when x knows every truth x can know. Now there are problems with this
revised deﬁnition. As Grim [] notes, the counterexamples to restricted versions of omnipotence
can be adapted to counterexamples here (consider McIg, who is necessarily such that he can only
ever know that he is conscious). Moreover, given the admission that there are truths God cannot
know, we would need independent motivation for the claim that set-theoretic truths featured in
Cantorian arguments are the kind of truths God cannot know — especially since we can.
Bringsjord’s second line of response will be more useful for our purposes, as it is a precursor
²¹Others e.g. Beall [] reject premise (ii).
²²Bringsjord’s actual deﬁnition is
x is omniscient ↔ ∀y(◇K(x; y)↔ K(x; y))
But this clearly cannot be right, since it would bring about failures of the factivity of knowledge: let S be some contingent
but actually false proposition. It’s possible that God knows S; in fact, at any world in which ‘S’ is true, God knows it.
But that cannot entail that God actually knows S, since S is actually false by supposition. The deﬁnition below solves
this problem.
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to the dialetheic solution. He suggests that the paradox can be avoided by rejecting (ii) and doing
without the Power Set axiom of Zermelo-Frankl set theory (ZF):
() ∀z∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ ∀w(w ∈ x→ w ∈ z))
By denying the above axiom, and hence countenancing an alternative set-theory, Bringsjord thinks
the theist can avoid Cantor’s Theorem and resolve the trouble. In response, Grim [] argues that
a similar argument can be given via other axioms of ZF (i.e. Separation), and so any such approach
would require even more drastic revisions to set theory. But it may be that some alternative set
theory can do the job without having to reject too much of ZF. This, I think, is the most plausible
dialetheic line of response.
. Inconsistent Set Theory and the Universal Set
Whether all quantiﬁcation is quantiﬁcation over set-like totalities is deeply controversial and itself
tied up with Russell’s paradox.²³ Dialetheists (Priest [, ch. ]) have defended the principle
that quantiﬁcation presupposes a corresponding set-like domain. For decades, dialetheic logicians
have been after an alternative set theory that vindicates the naïve conception of a set, given by the
Naïve Comprehension Schema and the Axiom of Extensionality.
Naïve Comprenhension is as follows:
() ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ≡ '(x))
Here '(x) is any predicate with just x free. The axiom of Extensionality is:²⁴
() ∀z∀y∀x(x ∈ y ≡ x ∈ z) ⊃ y = z
²³See e.g []. Simmons [] argues that if we accept that the concepts of ‘set’ or ‘truth’ are indeﬁnitely extensible,
then we can save a version of omniscience.
²⁴We have not given semantic clauses for ‘=’. So, ‘y = z’ is treated as an abbreviation for ∀w(y ∈ w ≡ z ∈ w).
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Call the instances of Naïve Comprehension and Extensionality ‘N’, for naïve set theory. Naïve
set theory is typically rejected because it generates inconsistency via the Russell set: just let '(x)
be {x ∶ x ∉ x} in the Comprehension Schema. But if our background logic is paraconsistent
this can be tolerated. In order to examine one such naïve set theory, we simply add a primitive
membership predicate (∈) to LP and look at the consequences of N within LP. (We stick with LP
here primarily because the arguments are more tractable. Set theory has been developed in our
oﬃcial logic DKQ ([, p.]) and is also non-trivial [].)²⁵
It can be shown that nearly all of the axioms of ZF are consequences of N. I say ‘nearly’
because the only axiom not included in the consequences of N is the axiom of Foundation or
Regularity:²⁶
() N ⊭LP ∀z(∃y(y ∈ z) ⊃ ∃y(y ∈ z ∧ ¬∃x(x ∈ y ∧ x ∈ z)))
We even have Power Set
() N ⊧LP ∀z∃y∀x(x ∈ y ≡ ∀w(w ∈ x ⊃ w ∈ z))
which is an instance of Naïve Comprehension with '(x) deﬁned as (w ∈ x ⊃ w ∈ z).
Grim argued contra Bringsjord that denying Power Set was not suﬃcient to get around the
paradox. What is interesting about the current approach is that it is not even necessary. This is
due to the fact that we have the existence of the universal set in the current framework:
() N ⊧LP ∃x∀y(y ∈ x)
(To prove this, assume for reductio that there is no universal set; one can show that the set of all
non-universal sets must be a universal set.²⁷)
²⁵See also [, ] for recent developments.
²⁶For a proof, see Restall [, p. ].
²⁷See Restall [, p. ].
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Given we have a universal set, U, the power set of U clearly cannot include anything more
than the original set. This does not run afoul of the Power Set axiom since ∀z(z ⊆ U ⊃ z ∈ U); that
is, U contains all of its own subsets. U is a counterexample to Cantor’s Theorem which fails in
N. So Grim’s paradox doesn’t get oﬀ the ground unless we have independent reason for thinking
that the set of truths cannot be mapped one-to-one with its power set.
More to the point: Naïve Comprehension gives a set of all truths:
() N ⊧LP ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ≡ T(x))
Call this set T. So premise (ii) of Grim’s argument is (at least) false. Is it also true? It will be if T
is an inconsistent; that is, if there are some members that are also non-members, or if some truths
are also false. In N, there are clearly inconsistent sets: the Russell set (which exists by plugging
x ∉ x into Naïve Comprehension) is an example:
() N ⊧LP ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ≡ x ∉ x)
So according to N, there both is and is not a set of all the propositions that God knows. Premise
(ii) of Grim’s argument is both true and false, and so is the consequent of premise (i). If premise
(i) is to receive a designated value, then it’s antecedent must also be true and false.²⁸ As a result,
the conclusion (iii) is also both true and false. We are in a position which by now will seem quite
familiar: it turns out that God is both omniscient and not omniscient. Again, dialetheism about
the set of all truths ‘spreads’ into God’s nature being inconsistent.
 Limiting the Spread of Inconsistency
We have seen a general pattern emerge from these discussions. The dialetheic solution to the var-
ious paradoxes of the divine attributes entail, by virtue of paraconsistent logic, that the attributes
²⁸This follows in DKQ from contraposition.
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themselves are inconsistently had by God. We can turn the screws even tighter: if omniscience
and omnipotence are both true of and false of God, then paraconsistent logic gives us the claim∃x(x is omniscient ∧ x is omnipotent ) is both true and false as well. In other words, the very
claim that an omni-being exists is inconsistent.
I have argued that these are logical consequences of dialetheic theism. But it is worth pausing
to notice that these consequences rest on two important assumptions: ﬁrstly, they rest on the
logical principle of contraposition; secondly, they rest on treating ‘omniscience’ and ‘omnipotence’
as deﬁned predicates.
. Rejecting Contraposition
Both the material conditional in LP and the primitive conditional in DKQ contrapose.
A ⊃ B ⊧LP ¬B ⊃ ¬A()
A→ B ⊢DKQ ¬B→ ¬A()
Recall that in LP, A ⊃ B is an abbreviation for ¬A∨B; so ¬B ⊃ ¬A is an abbreviation for ¬¬B∨¬A,
which by double negation is B∨¬A. The validity of contraposition in DKQ can be seen in axiom
VI and the rule form derived via RII (see Appendix).
This assumption was crucial throughout our discussion. Consider again our working deﬁni-
tion of ‘omnipotence’.
x is omnipotent ↔ ∀y(◇B(x; y))
This deﬁnition is a biconditional, and hence has two directions. Of particular relevance is the left-
to-right direction; which when contraposed is ¬∀y(◇B(x; y)) → ¬(x is omnipotent). I argued
in §. that the dialetheic theist must accept that ¬∀y(◇B(g; y)) and concluded that God is not
omnipotent. Contraposition played the same role in § regarding the deﬁnition of omniscience.
In §, we can see the use of contraposition indirectly in Grim’s paradox. The ﬁnal step in the

argument is a direct application of modus tollens on premise (i), which is closely related to the
contraposability of the conditional.
But not all paraconsistent logics permit contraposition and modus tollens, however. Many
paraconsistent logics fail to validate either inference. The weak relevant systems K4 and N4 are
good examples (Priest [, ch. ]). In DKQ, it is very natural to deﬁne a non-contraposable
conditional in the logic. To do so we add a logical constant t that obeys the two-way rule:
() A ⊣⊢DKQ t→ A
The t-constant may be thought of as the conjunction of all (actual) truths. We can then deﬁne a
conditional connective in terms of it thus:
() A↦ B ∶= (A ∧ t)→ B
This deﬁned conditional does not contrapose:
() A↦ B ⊬DKQ ¬B↦ ¬A
We can think of t as taking the value 12 , since the conjunction of all truths will contain at least
some dialetheia. But then (A) = 1 and (B) = 12 gives a countermodel.
The upshot is that, if a dialetheic theist can make the case that omnipotence and omniscience
should be deﬁned using ↦ rather than →, they can avoid inconsistent omni-attributes. The
reply is not ad hoc if the failure of contraposition can be motivated independently by dialetheists.
Consider the purported entailment from ‘All As are Bs’ to ‘All non-Bs are non-As’. Suppose further
that B is an inconsistent property. Should something’s being a non-B entail it’s being a non-A?
As is an example, imagine there were a swan that was both black and not black; would it follow
that it wasn’t a swan? Why? (Answering that everything follows from a black and non-black swan

would be to beg the question against paraconsistency.)
A more pressing reason for rejecting contraposition is that the following three principles are
mutually problematic.
A→ B;A ⊧ B()
A→ B ⊧ ¬B→ ¬A()
A ⊧ B→ A()
As Beall et. al. [] have noted, they jointly force the validity of ECQ, and hence cannot all be
included in any paraconsistent logic.
¬B
B
A→ B¬B→ ¬A¬A
So any paraconsistent dialetheist must reject one of these three principles on pain of triviality.
The LP material conditional ⊃ fails the ﬁrst (modus ponens); the primitive DKQ conditional →
fails the last (weakening); and the deﬁned DKQ conditional fails contraposition. There is strong
reason to think that contraposition is least motivated from a dialetheic perspective. Rejecting
contraposition, then, is an avenue for the dialetheic theist to limit the spread of contradictions
andmaintain that God’s nature and existence remains consistent even if his actions and knowledge
are not.
. Primitive Attributes
I want to brieﬂy explore a second avenue for limiting the spread of contradictions. We have
been treating omnipotence and omniscience as deﬁned predicates, but we might wish to reject
that treatment. On the proposed view, the divine attributes cannot be analyzed by necessary
and suﬃcient conditions; they are primitive attributes. We could for instance accept that there

are suﬃcient conditions for omnipotence, i.e. the right-to-left direction of our biconditional
deﬁnitions, without requiring omnipotence to be logically deﬁned by that condition. Similarly
for omniscience.
On this proposal, there is no need for inconsistency in divine actions or inconsistency in the
set of known truths to bleed back into inconsistencies in the divine nature. In fact, there is a
way to formally ensure that the divine attributes remain consistent in paraconsistent logics like
LP and DKQ due to Priest [, §.] and developed by Beall []. Where  is a propositional
constant such that w() = 0 for all worlds w, we can make any sentence A consistent by adding
the following principle as a primitive rule of our theory.
() A ∧ ¬A ⊧ 
More generally, we can make any n-ary predicate P consistent by adding the following:
() ∃x1 : : :∃xn(P(x1; : : : xn) ∧ ¬P(x1; : : : xn)) ⊧ 
So if we added the corresponding axioms for our two primitive unary predicates expressing om-
niscience and omnipotence, we would guarantee that the divine attributes were consistent and
preserve the simple truth of God’s existence.
 Semantic versus Metaphysical Dialetheism
To some, these logical maneuvers may not inspire conﬁdence: dialetheic theists will need to oﬀer
additional philosophical motivation (perhaps they can borrow from the literature on dialetheism)
for whatever routes they choose. Alternatively, I would suggest that dialetheic theists simply accept
the logical consequences of the view, and temper the philosophical signiﬁcance of inconsistencies
in God’s attributes by appealing to another well-known distinction in the literature: Mares’ []
distinction between semantic and metaphysical dialetheism. Metaphysical dialetheism is the view

that “there are things in the world that are actually inconsistent” while semantic dialetheism is
the view that “there are no inconsistencies in things but […] inconsistencies arise because of the
relationship between language and the world” ().²⁹
Consistency, it is sometimes thought, is a property of representations of the world and not of
the world itself. Compare Swinburne:
…[L]ogical necessity is at root a feature of actual human sentences and how they are
used. It governs language, and not the world. ([, p. ])
On this view, to think that God himself is metaphysically inconsistent would be project a feature of
human representations on to God. Theologians often regard projections of our forms of thought
onto the being of God as a particularly pernicious kind of error.
Semantic dialetheic theists will maintain that our best descriptions of God in language requires
inconsistency, but we need not think these inconsistencies are univocal and literally accurate
descriptions of the metaphysical characteristics of God. Descartes seems to hold precisely this
view:
[Divine power] involves a contradictory conception; that is, is inconceivable by us.
But I do not think we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by
God. I would dare not even say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley,
or bring it about that  and  are not . I merely say that he has given me such a
mind that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley or a sum of  and  which
is not ; such things involve a contradiction in my conception. (‘To Arnauld’, [, p.
])
The idea sits well within certain Christian traditions of theology (e.g. the apophatic and volun-
tarist traditions) that emphasize God’s transcendence beyond the created order, and God’s aseity
or absolute independence from anything outside himself. So, there are theological motivations
²⁹Beall [], Bobenreith [], Kroon [], and Mares [] are self-avowed semantic dialetheists. For Priest’s discussion
on whether he is a metaphysical dialetheist, see Priest [, pp. –].
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for semantic dialetheic theism, according to which it is merely our representations of God that
are inconsistent, perhaps due to underlying intellectual or linguistic limitations.³⁰
I have not attempted to answer every possible objection to dialetheic theism.³¹ My aim has
been primarily exploratory — to see what insights might be gained from contemporary develop-
ments in paraconsistent logic.
Dialetheic theism is a logically coherent (even if inconsistent!) view, with well-studied and
comprehensive formal underpinnings. It solves a range of paradoxes regarding the divine at-
tributes, and that is something to be said in its favor. The view has some untoward consequences,
but I’ve suggested avenues toward mitigating them. I do not expect the view to be popular; I am
not recommending it be believed. But if we have learned anything from the literature on the se-
mantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, it is that dialetheism — when supplemented with rigorously
developed paraconsistent logics — has proven to be a serious contender. Is dialetheic theism is a
serious contender? I don’t know, but developing the view paying careful attention to the resources
of paraconsistent logic is the ﬁrst step toward ﬁnding out.³²
³⁰For further motivations from Christian theology, see Beall [].
³¹For a good selection of objections to a related view called universal possibilism see Plantinga []; see McCann []
for discussion. Some have suggested dialetheism will make the Problem of Evil more diﬃcult for the theist. See
Conee [, §VI].
³²Thanks to David Aiken, Don Baxter, Tim Baylor, Colin Caret, Filippo Casati, Mark Gedney, Alexus McLeod,
Hitoshi Omori, Andrew Parisi, Greg Restall, Dave Ripley, Kevin Scharp, Patrick Todd, and Alan Torrance (among
others who I am surely forgetting) for discussion of these and related ideas. Special thanks go to Jc Beall for discussions
on these topics spanning a decade. Thanks to three anonymous referees for this journal for detailed comments on earlier
versions of this paper.
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
Appendix
Below is a presentation of the relevant logic DKQ.³³ The language is that of ﬁrst-order logic.
All instances of the following axiom schemata are theorems:
I. A→ A
IIa. (A ∧ B)→ A
IIb. (A ∧ B)→ B
III. A ∧ (B ∨C)→ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧C)) Distribution
IV. ((A→ B) ∧ (B→ C))→ (A→ C) Conjunctive Syllogism
V. ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ B ∧C)
VI. (A→ B)↔ (¬B→ ¬A) Contraposition
VII. A↔ ¬¬A Double Negation Elimination
VIII. A ∨ ¬A Excluded Middle
IX. ∀xA→ A(a/x)
X. ∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB) (with x not free in A)
XI. ∀x(A ∨ B)→ (A ∨ ∀xB) (with x not free in A)
The following rules are valid:
RI. A;B ⊢ A ∧ B Adjunction
RII. A;A→ B ⊢ B Modus Ponens
RIII. A ⊢ ∀xA Universal Generalization
RIV. A→ B;C→ D ⊢ (B→ C)→ (A→ D) Hypothetical Syllogism
The following meta-rules preserve validity:
A ⊢ B
A ∨C ⊢ B ∨C A ⊢ B∃xA ⊢ ∃xB
³³This presentation follows closely that of [].
